There's More Than One Way to be ‘Serious’ about City-Regions

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Abstract

This short essay responds to Harding’s own response to our recent debate on city regions in this journal. While we welcome Harding’s contribution, we also take issue with aspects of his critique. First, we reiterate our claims that the emergence in recent years of a variety of city-region models cannot be traced back to neoliberalism alone. Second, we suggest that the introduction of more economics into the political economic study of city-regions is not as straightforward as Harding implies. We highlight the different ways in which economics and the economy are understood. Third, we consider what we see as a problematic distinction between ‘abstract’ theory and ‘applied’ policy work, and argue instead that a more fruitful way forward is to ensure all academics reflect on the variety of ways in which they may represent their research according to the intended publics. In light of this we make no apologies for adopting the approach we did in our debates forum.

Introduction

Alan Harding’s (2007) recent commentary in the International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (IJURR) on our invitation to a debate on the new political, economic, environmental and social geographies of city-regions raises several conceptual and methodological issues to which we wish to respond. We want to say at the outset that we welcome Harding’s commentary, not least because it is precisely the sort of debate and discussion that our editorial was written to encourage. In particular, he raises several pertinent points about the economic and political contexts for the recent academic and policy-maker interest in city-regions and about the role of theory vis-à-vis applied research in the practical shaping of city-region material geographies. In these respects, his commentary does not undermine our central claim that the city-region concept has undergone a renaissance in recent years, as has state policy and political discussions relating to the development and enhanced governance capacities of city-regions around the world. However, Harding’s commentary does take issue with the ways in which we deal with this resurgence in our debates forum.

Harding’s main point seems to be that, welcome though our forum is, city-regional researchers should be more engaged in progressive agendas to rebuild cities and regions

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that are economically viable and liveable, environmentally sustainable and socially just. Harding offers UK city-regionalism as a model of the kind of engaged progressive agenda academics like us ought to be engaging with on a day-to-day basis. The issues in which Harding and other progressive intellectuals-cum-policymakers are engaged are far too important for the kinds of esoteric intellectual agenda we seem to be offering. At least, this is one of the implications of his commentary.

In comparison to Harding’s praxis-motivated and policy-engaged intellectual-cum-political agenda, we are seen to have resorted to armchair theorizing — ‘abstract, critical state theory’ (p. 455). One indication of this is that we appear to ascribe to all forms of city-regionalism some sort of overarching neoliberal or capitalist spatial logic. In Harding’s view, this leaves very little scope in our approach for identifying, participating in, and constructing progressive social, environmental and political agendas around city-regionalism.

In fact, if Harding is to be believed, none of the contributors to our debates forum has a clear progressive political agenda to offer. This is because only two contributors discuss the politics of city-regionalism in any meaningful or substantive fashion (although nonetheless they are guilty of asserting neoliberal hegemony), whilst the remainder fail to make a convincing argument in support of the city-region concept. Collectively, we are variously accused of engaging with ‘simplifying assumptions’ about city-regions (p. 445), casting it as an ‘ill-defined neoliberal plot’ (p. 446) and not discussing or engaging with any of the policy-related literature on city-regions (p. 446). Moreover, we are unable to offer a cogent analysis of the underlying economic causality of city-regional resurgence, failing to acknowledge the insights of the ‘new economic geography’ (p. 447). Nor have we demonstrated the political integrity of the city-region concept, thereby undermining the intellectual project almost before we’ve had a chance to lay it out. We deal with these issues as follows.

City-regionalisms: neoliberal ‘plot’ or spaces of class-distributional politics?

Harding’s main point seems to be that we ascribe to all forms of city-regionalism some sort of global neoliberal plot. To back up this assertion, he claims there are more than 70 references to the terms neoliberal, neoliberalism and neoliberalization in the collection (p. 445). Having observed this empirical regularity, Harding is able to impute to the debates forum a particular agenda or direction of causality. Specifically, our agenda is in fact not to open up a debate about the underlying geographies of city-regionalism. Rather, it is encourage researchers to demonstrate or prove that neoliberalism is an overarching condition and cause of city-regional resurgence. Ergo the forum is not about city-regions at all but rather is an attempt to uncover yet another neoliberal plot to undermine the role of geography (in this case, the geography of city-regions). We are therefore to be cast as liberal-minded, well-meaning and yet politically naive geographers, who happen to like city-regions but don’t have much to contribute to the wider world especially outside the narrow intellectual confines of academia.

At one level, this intellectual claim (or perhaps more accurately, political accusation) is easy to rebut. At no point in our introduction do we ever make the claim explicitly or even implicitly that city-regionalism is a neoliberal conspiracy. To paraphrase Harding’s reference to Storper and Manville (2006), we are interested in taking ‘greater account of the variety of ways in which the preferences and [collective] behaviour of multiple economic [as well as political, social and environmental] agents are shaped by particular material contexts, rather than assuming these can be read off from a logic that is invisible to them’ (p. 455). For the moment, let us set aside the issue of whether people always act individually on the basis of ‘visible’ preferences rather than collectively when faced with ‘invisible’ structural or material constraints. Instead, let us think about
these ‘logics’ and whether or not they are visible in the intellectual and political landscapes of city-regionalism.

First of all, the word ‘neoliberalism’ is not as visible in our introduction as Harding implies. In fact ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘neoliberalization’ do not appear in our introduction, while ‘neoliberal’ appears only six times. This alone should have given some indication of where our intellectual priorities lay. Where the word ‘neoliberal’ first appears is three pages into our piece on p. 171. But it is put there not to make the case that city-regionalism is a neoliberal plot but rather to contextualize the discussion of Jane Jacobs’ authoritative work on city-regional economies. At the outset, and given the space limitations of this collection, we were quite careful to identify a number of different strands to previous and ongoing work on city-regions, the discussion of Jacobs and city-regional economies being one of a number of cuts into the debate. Nor did we associate the rise of the city-region concept with the rise of neoliberalism per se (in fact, the city-region concept itself probably predates that of neoliberalism).

Having pointed out our apparently mistaken prioritization of neoliberalism, Harding makes an oblique reference to American neo-conservatism, implying that this offers something different to what we have to say about city-regions (p. 447). There might well be some sort of connection between city-regionalism and the kind of neo-conservative thinking associated with theories of the public economy of metropolitan areas in the United States. In this respect, neo-conservatism (public choice theory) and neoliberalism (business-led or market reformism) are indeed quite distinctive intellectual traditions and political discourses in debates about metropolitan governance in America. As one of us has argued in his previous work on metropolitan reform in America, they underpin a concrete class-distributional politics of service provision and economic development as expressed through locational demands in different local jurisdictions (Cox and Jonas, 1993). Moreover, these different metropolitan and regional discourses have given rise to quite separate and conflicting reformist principles at the federal, state and city-regional levels across the USA. For us to have conflated neoliberalism with all contemporary political forms and discourses of city-regionalism would have been quite wrong — and is something we don’t believe we did; nor have we been tempted to do so in the past. We are left wondering if Harding is himself aware of the full extent and nature of class and distributional spatial interests variously in support of, or working against, the kind of liberal and progressive city-regionalist politics he himself advocates.

Furthermore, we would strongly reject any suggestion that the political-economic geography of a city-regionalism can be attributed solely to the instrumental actions of self-serving political or ideological neoliberal elite. This is not to say there are no class-based or elite political interests underpinning, promoting, or constructed through, city-regions and city-regional political imaginaries. There clearly are. Nor is it to suggest that such interests cannot be investigated through empirical (applied and/or theoretically informed) policy research. However, we remain puzzled by Harding’s belief that we elide city-regionalism with neoliberalism.

Geographical economics, anyone?

A second aspect of Harding’s response with which we wish to take issue is his use of what he and others have termed ‘new economic geography’. We will leave to one side issues of precisely how ‘new’ this body of work is, and the nature of its rather tenuous relationship to economic geography proper (Martin and Sunley, 2001; Overman, 2004). Instead we shall concentrate on how this work ‘within mainstream economics’ (p. 446) — which others have called ‘geographical economics’, a term we are more comfortable with — is explained to have apparently only recently discovered the existence of cities and the urbanization process more generally. This is perhaps not surprising when one considers that Paul Krugman, one of its chief protagonists, began his 1991 collection of lectures Geography and trade by acknowledging that ‘I have spent my whole professional life as
an international economist thinking and writing about economic geography, without being aware of it’ (see, for example, Barnes, 2001; Sheppard, 2001). Rooted in their neo-classical moorings, this realization by a small group of economists that ‘space matters’ argues that ‘the balance between forces of economic dispersion...and agglomeration, which is associated with the concentration of economic activity...has recently tipped in favour of the latter to the economic advantage of the larger cities’ (p. 447).

What is behind the emergence of urban centres of economic production is not clear, according to Harding and those upon whom he draws. A number of factors are discussed, the causes of the ‘growing preferences on the part of firms or households to base themselves in, or near to, dominant metropolitan centres because they see such choice as functional to maximizing business opportunities or life chances’ (p. 447). With more than a hint of methodological individualism and rational choice theory, it is individual preferences that have produced the current urban condition as it is experienced in cities of the industrialized nations of the north. Out of this review of the literature comes a call from Harding (p. 455) for ‘considerably more economics in the political economy of city regions’. This sounds appealing enough but it rather presupposes only one way of understanding ‘the economy’ and ‘economics’. If nothing else, recent debates within economic geography over its relationship with (mainstream) neo-classical economics, amongst other apparently cognate disciplines, has demonstrated that there is more than one version of ‘economics’ and more than one way of understanding ‘the economy’ (Amin and Thrift, 2000; Martin and Sunley, 2001). Neo-classical economics — itself understood here as a plurality of approaches which share certain micro and macro features — is certainly one possibility, and it is that, with its ‘clean, abstract and parsimonious modelling tradition’ (Peck, 2005: 132), which underpins the recent work on geographical economics (Martin and Sunley, 1996; Fujita et al., 1999; Martin, 1999; Brackman et al., 2001; Fujita and Krugman, 2004).

Another approach, and one with which we are more comfortable, is that which is currently favoured in economic geography. This shares some features with some versions of economic sociology, and draws on neo-Marxian and neo-Polanyian theorizations of the economy, and alongside neo-Gramscian theories of the state, differs quite considerably from the neo-classical strand of economics. This produces empirically rich accounts of concrete and socially situated economic processes...emphasize[s] the essential diversity of economic phenomena, favoring context-rich explanations in which history is taken seriously...attach greater significance to plausibility and explanatory power than to elegance and predictive power...and...strive[s] to explain, and often improve, the characteristically messy economic worlds that they encounter (Peck, 2005: 132).

Any attempt to emphasize the ‘economics’ in the political economy of city-regions we would argue has to start with a theorization of the economy and the state that is commensurable to political economy as we understand it. The sort of geographical economics that Harding draws upon does not, we believe, offer the most fruitful way of upping the ‘economic’ content of the political economy of cities, as Harding (p. 455) puts it.

City-regionalism: abstract theory, material and political reality, or both?

A third important comment offered by Harding is that our debates forum offers at best a partially successful attempt to engage with city-region theories. For him, it fails utterly to deal with city-region material conditions and with political realities on the ground. Here, he is at some pains to point out that that city-regionalism in the UK is not a
neoliberal conspiracy but rather a political response to material realities, not least the spatial effects of the economics of agglomeration. These effects suggest that certain city-regions in the UK have in fact performed rather well according to measures of gross value added (GVA; London and Manchester); whereas others have not fared at all well (the City of Hull and the Humber Ports, for instance). As Harding suggests, recent years have witnessed a ‘pronounced but highly uneven city-focused economic renaissance’ (p. 448). Harding’s maps are quite striking. As representations they certainly suggest that the UK’s urban economies have in recent years boomed. Of, course, what this means for the residents, and the wider environmental and social conditions under which they live and labour, is not so clear.

Before we discuss the more productive ‘Manchester’ and the less productive ‘Hull and the Humber Ports’, two city-regions with which we are intimately familiar, we present some general comments on the ‘city-focused economic renaissance’. A glance at the Index of Multiple Deprivation (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2004) suggests that while GVA per capita has been rising in a number of the UK’s city-regional areas, the ‘hot spots’ Harding highlights, so too has inequality. The 2004 data — the most recent data available — suggest that while the UK’s city-regional economies may be more productive, they are also more unequal. In narrow economic terms Harding’s two maps reveal how the city-regions ‘focused upon the larger, economically diverse and best connected provincial conurbations’ (pp. 449–50) have performed best. These same places are also home to the most deprived ‘super output areas’ (SOAs). The biggest GVA gainers — the most economically successful areas — are also those where residents have an unhealthy balance of too much of some things (crime, environmental pollution, ill-health, etc.) and not enough of others (income, education, employment, good air quality, etc.). Manchester appears no less than 11 times in the list of the top 30 most multiply deprived SOAs. If there is still an in-principle commitment to territorial redistribution, as there was under the spatial Keynesianism of the 1950s and 1960s, then what is on these maps (and, as importantly, what is not) suggests that in practice the UK is becoming an increasingly geographically uneven set of countries. Furthermore, with three-quarters of the extra wealth generated in the UK over the last decade going to those with above average incomes, and a third going to the very richest 10% (Palmer et al., 2006), the overlapping and intertwined geographies of GVA gainers and poverty losers looks set to persist. This leads us academically (and politically) to reflect upon the basis on which these data are collated, presented and interpreted.

To begin with, the data Harding presents are spatially disaggregated across the UK at the subregional scale so as to get at more detailed local variations in GVA. However, the data conceal significant intra urban–regional disparities. For instance, we could point to intensely localized areas of poverty and worklessness within urban places like Hull and Manchester or between urban, suburban and rural areas. This raises questions about how such spatial disparities work through local political representations and discourses: discourses of redistribution from the rural back to the urban through, for example, rateable property values or redrawing of school catchment areas. Where and how are these issues represented in UK city-regionalism, if at all?

There is also a problem — or politics — of spatial data aggregation as much as there is one of disaggregation (this suggests another sort of ‘scalar politics’ — the politics of spatial data scales). Harding’s maps represent EU NUTs regions based on the administrative boundaries of local unitary authorities. His maps are not in fact a ‘true’ representation of UK or English city-regions as defined by state authorities or regional political coalitions such as the ‘Northern Way’. For instance, the Hull and Humber Ports City Region is not the area shown on the map as Hull. It is in fact an imaginary or loosely bounded territorial construct spanning both sides of the River Humber (the inlet shown on the East Coast of the UK). So Harding’s chosen spatial data units no more accurately measure the real-politic of city-regionalism than they reveal the scalar-spatial economics of agglomeration.
A detailed study of the real-politics of city-regionalism within the Hull and Humber Ports City Region would perhaps point to the uneven distribution of wealth and resources between rural and urban areas, and between ‘north’ and ‘south’ bank towns. It might also consider how in turn this spatial distributional politics intersects with a distinctly English (rather than UK) politics of city-regionalism (note, the Core Cities initiative in England was quite separate from the Northern Way but both represent emerging spatialities of city-regionalism). Our concern here is not just about abstract versus concrete research. It is about how material realities and questions of data analysis inform or misinform policy and political debates. The same materialities can in fact produce quite different scalar political constructions of city-regionalism.

**Different publics, different representations of academic research?**

Finally, we are intrigued that Harding seems to find it so easy to separate (his) progressive policy work from (our) intellectual and critical analysis. To make such a (sharp) distinction between theory and policy or empirics may come as a bit of a surprise to readers of *IJURR*, a journal that surely has built up a huge international reputation for critical urban and regional policy analysis. We could point out that our introduction in fact builds upon previous critical, empirical and policy-engaged work on city-regions and the politics of urban and regional development, which we have conducted together and separately in the UK and USA over a number of years (Jonas and Ward, 2002; Ward and Jonas, 2004). In our 2004 article in *Environment and Planning A*, for example, we engaged with the theoretical literature on city-regions in considerable depth. In that article, we concluded not that city-regionalism was a neoliberal plot but that theorists had tended to overemphasize an exchange-relation interpretation. In our earlier jointly authored article in the *Journal of Urban Affairs* we explicitly identified different strands in the policy literatures on city-regions and regionalism in the UK and USA, respectively. There our aim was to reveal a ‘world of regionalisms’ rather than a single, unidirectional and universal neoliberal logic. In this respect, our analysis of city-regions has worked from the empirical back up to theory and abstraction and then back down to concrete synthesis.

Likewise, all of the contributors are at great pains (within the limits of a debates forum) to explore the specific contexts and processes around which a politics of city-regionalism is or is not constructed. As Harding rightly points out, McGuiirk and McCann respectively show how in Australia city-regionalism is state orchestrated around the imaginary of global Sydney, whereas in Austin city-regional politics and processes are very different in terms of the role of the state and the inflection of race and class into city-regionalism. As even Harding suggests, these differences are sufficiently important to examine in greater depth so that we can learn from different experiences, make comparisons, widen intellectual and political agendas, and build partnerships and alliances around more just and sustainable cities and regions. Likewise, the other contributions show how the city-region concept offers a way into other important issues and debates such as the nature of modern democracy in the city (Purcell), social reproduction and work–life balance (Jarvis), and urban sustainability (Krueger and Savage).

To reiterate, our intention was to encourage an *academic* debate about city-regions. In this regard, it is hardly surprising that we engage in discursive representations of city-regions rather than attempting to promote a particular political vision of city-regionalism (progressive or otherwise). *IJURR* is an academic journal. The bulk of the audience for our introduction would have been other academics. It seems to us that the debate about political alternatives would be best conducted in other forums. For example, perhaps at stakeholder meetings of city-regional partnerships like the Northern Way or, as one of us
has done, participating in various consultation rounds on issues feeding into city-regional politics in the Hull and Humber Ports City Region. Academics represent their interests and concerns to non-academic audiences in a number of ways. Examples include speaking at ‘public’ debates, writing commentaries for ‘local’ newspapers, and acting as consultants for government agencies. All are means of constructing different publics for the work of academics. So, there are ways of engaging in the realpolitics of city-regions from a variety of stances and perspectives. A forum like *IJURR* allows academics to learn from other research and bring new ideas into other arenas, including those of the classroom, the boardroom, consultative processes, planning and policy activism. These spaces provide a range of ways of writing and speaking to different audiences in and through which it is possible to engage in this important city-region debate.

**The politics of visibility and invisibility in city-region theory: taking the debate forward**

In conclusion, let us reiterate that we are pleased that Harding engaged in an open discussion of the city-region concept and its resurgence in urban and regional analysis. However, we are also a little concerned. We feel that we have been quite open and upfront about our intellectual agenda. Harding, on the other, has been a little less revealing, a little more circumspect. In this conclusion we offer some thoughts on what we believe might have been his ‘real’ target and then proceed to widen the discussion, setting out some possible new directions for city-region research.

There is one clue in Harding’s commentary relating to whom or what is the ‘invisible’ target of his critique. This comes in the otherwise misinformed reference to Neil Brenner’s influential work on neoliberal urban governance in North America and Europe (Brenner, 2002; Brenner and Theodore, 2002). We are certainly familiar with Brenner’s work on the scalar politics of metropolitan governance (and have discussed it in earlier articles). However, a review of Brenner’s work was not central to our discussion. Rather, we wanted to widen the research agenda around city-regions to incorporate issues that do not feature so centrally in the writings of scholars such as Brenner; categories such as political democracy, environment and sustainability, social policy, the politics of the city-region living place, etc. Nonetheless, Harding’s claim that Brenner’s work was once ‘most influenced by the concept of neoliberalism’ is suggestive (p. 451). It is true that considerable intellectual energy has been expended in grounding critical urban theory in a more abstract discussion of the contradictions of neoliberalism (see, for instance, Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Hackworth, 2007). This work continues, and is evolving into new directions including some that engage with other utopian ideals, distributional politics, and collective consumption (see Cochrane, 2007); as also is our work on urban politics and city-regions.

Perhaps Harding was not so much identifying some sort of immanent neoliberal plot in our symposium as raising a wider issue about the relationship between critical urban theory, urban policy and political practice. Maybe the target of Harding’s critique is all those who work on abstract state restructuring and spatial policy, and who use neoliberalism as a convenient shorthand or meta-theoretical device useful for engaging in wider economic and political processes. If this is the case, he ought perhaps to be a little more precise in specifying the target of his critique.

Nevertheless, there are ways we believe of dealing with Harding’s apparent and underlying concern that urban theory is overpopulated by references to neoliberalism, neoliberalization, etc. For example, there is increasing awareness of the importance of grounding the ‘process of neoliberalization’ (this itself is not a very satisfactory concept and we would certainly not use it in our work in an unreflexive or uncritical fashion) in particular spatial contexts. In using this term researchers are exploring how neoliberal ideas and agendas work through particular social and political agencies and spatial
practices. In the context of work on city-regions, the intellectual strategy is one that would show what particular causal processes and contingent conditions are producing neoliberal urban and regional political forms and institutional processes, and how these in turn conflict with other spatial agendas and structures.

However, Harding seems to offer the counter-criticism that because theorists (like us presumably) have been overeager in latching on to the neoliberal buzzword, there is a need to examine how countervailing ideologies and political processes can be read in the unfolding landscapes of city-regionalism and state policy. Taking this counter-claim at face value, and being openly critical of Harding’s own agenda, we would want to find clear evidence that progressive, social democratic economic, social and environmental agendas do in fact underpin city-regionalism in the UK. How does a ‘third way’ liberal or social-democratic politics of city-regionalism in England differ from, say, egalitarian liberalism and metropolitan reformism as found in the different states of America. For example, California’s New Regionalism may well be ‘progressive’ and is built to some extent around city-regions; it even draws on models of social capital derived from the European context. Nonetheless, it still represents a business-led progressivism (i.e. there is an identifiable class-based political interest) and how this has influenced a populist view that local and state government in California is weak and unresponsive to the local interests of voters, taxpayers and property owners (Jonas and Pincetl, 2006).

The contributions in our debates forum all suggest that in other contexts other interests and agendas underpin city-regional politics (e.g. the articles by Purcell, Jarvis and Krueger and Savage). But these articles also correctly point out that we should be careful not to impute too much political agency to city-regionalism as a ‘space of political engagement’ (Cox, 1998) at the expense of knowledge of the particular material interests and issues within and around which city-regions and city-regional coalitions may be constructed and fought.

So perhaps one of the main issues emerging from our response is as follows: are we talking about city-regionalism as spatially contingent outcome of global neoliberalism (Harding’s political conspiracy theory) or are we instead pointing to something quite different, perhaps even necessary, arising from the existing conditions of contemporary processes of city-regional development? Moreover, something that is potentially progressive but possibly also reactionary and undemocratic? Our suggestion is that the economics of city-regional agglomeration (as much as the politics of city-regionalism) are creating tensions and interests around which new alliances and struggles could be coalescing. Moreover, we suggest that knowledge of such political alliances and the underlying geography of material interests and issues are not reducible to spatial economic forces of agglomeration; and nor are they a direct response or effect of state rescaling. They are wrapped up into the ‘politics of scale’ around city-regionalism.

Perhaps city-regional theory does offer an opportunity to rethink the social relations of production and distribution and from this build progressive political coalitions and social movements. These presumably would have to be quite different in nature and strategy to the urban social movements and policy interventions of the 1960s and 1970s but there is increasingly likely to be something city-regional about these progressive forces — this is a function of the ways in which capitalism has developed spatially around major urban and regional agglomerations. Quite simply it is where many (a majority of?) people in the developed and also parts of the developing world work and live. In this extent, we agree with Cochrane (2007: 145) that a consideration of how urban policy has developed since the 1960s ‘opens up a space in which debates about alternative futures can be launched or engaged in, even if at any one point in time that space appears to be dominated by the latest policy fashion apparently delivered from on high’. In setting up the debate in terms of a dichotomy between his progressive UK city-regionalism and our apparently totalizing category of neoliberal city-regionalism, Harding is not progressing things in a direction that we would particularly like to encourage. Not all city-regionalisms are the same misguided
outcomes of the localizing effects of neoliberalism. As places of politics and struggle, city-regions matter.

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References
Résumé

Ce court article répond à la réaction de Harding à notre récent débat sur les régions métropolitaines paru dans cette revue. Si nous saluons sa contribution, nous sommes néanmoins en désaccord avec plusieurs aspects de sa critique. Premièrement, nous réaffirmons que l’apparition récente de plusieurs modèles de région métropolitaine ne peut être imputée au seul néolibéralisme. Deuxièmement, nous pensons qu’intégrer davantage d’Économie dans l’économie politique des régions métropolitaines n’est pas aussi facile que le sous-entend Harding; à cet égard, nous soulignons les différentes façons dont on peut comprendre Économie et économie. Troisièmement, à notre avis, il s’agit d’un problème de distinction entre théorie ‘abstraite’ et travaux de politique ‘appliquée’; il nous paraît donc plus constructif de s’assurer que tous les chercheurs réfléchissent aux multiples manières de représenter leurs travaux en fonction des publics visés. C’est pourquoi nous assumons pleinement l’approche que nous avons adoptée dans notre forum de débat.