AGEING WORKING PAPERS

Maintaining Prosperity In An Ageing Society: the OECD study on the policy implications of ageing

THE BASIC DEMOGRAPHY:
SOURCES AND METHODS USED IN ANNEX 1 OF "MAINTAINING PROSPERITY IN AN AGEING SOCIETY"

WORKING PAPER AWP 6.3

This is one of a series of analytic papers that supported the OECD's ageing study, a "horizontal"project in the sense that it involved a number of OECD directorates. The results of the entire project are summarised in *Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society* , OECD 1998.

The paper describes the methods used in constructing the demographic and labour force trends and projections used in *Maintaining Prosperity* and, in particular, the graphs found in Annex 1.

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**THE BASIC DEMOGRAPHY: SOURCES AND METHODS USED IN ANNEX 1 OF
"MAINTAINING PROSPERITY IN AN AGEING SOCIETY"**

I. Introduction

The first part of Chapter 1 of *Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society* (OECD, 1998*a)* outlines the demographic challenge faced by OECD countries in coming decades, stressing likely reductions in the proportion of the population in employment and changes in the allocation of work and leisure over individuals lives. This story is amplified by a series of Figures (A1 to A6) in Annex 1, *The Effects of Demography*[1] (errata are noted in Box 1 below). Figure A1 draws attention to the historical increase in the number of years spent in retirement by both sexes and reductions in years spent in employment, particularly by men.   Figure A2 indicates the likely path of future trends in years spent in employment if current trends in participation continue into the future. Figures A3 and A4 point to likely reductions in the share of those employed in the total population in coming decades and concommitant increases in the ratio of elderly persons to those of working age and in employment. Figure A5 shows a set of demographic scenarios which illustrate that the likely range of demographic outcomes within the next three decades is relatively narrow, implying that demographic factors cannot, by themselves, solve the ageing challenge. Figure A6 shows to what extent a reversal in the participation rates of older cohorts could help prevent reduction in the share of employment in the total population. This note provides details about the sources and methods used to generate the figures. Prior to this a number of general points can be made.

BOX 1. ERRATA IN THE FIGURES.

Figure A1: the scale on the horizontal axis should be half the width shown between the years 1990 and 1995.

Figure A5: there are typographical errors in the fertility figures shown at the bottom of the figure. The baseline fertiltiy rate is constant at 1.6 children and is trended downwards to 1.4 children by 2030 in the low fertility scenario and upwards to 2.3 children by 2030 in the high fertility scenario (all other scenarios use the baseline fertility rate).

First, all the figures, in one way or another, are based on unweighted averages of data across OECD member countries.   Therefore, country differences are not emphasised and

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1.   Note that Figure A3 and Figure A4 also appear in the main text of Chapter 1 of Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society as Figures 1.1 and 1.2 respectively. In addition, some of these figures appeared in The OECD Observer No. 212, June/July 1998.

equivalent calculations for some countries may even suggest contrasting conclusions to those drawn in the text. The averaged data was generated as follows:

- Figure A1 is based on taking direct averages of individual calculations made by the Secretariat of the allocation of time to schooling, employment, retirement and other activities over individuals' lifetimes across 15 OECD countries. The data show historical trends from 1960 to 1995.

- Figures A2, A3, A4 and A6 are based not on individual country calculations but on a common set of average population shares, labour force participation rates and unemployment rates calculated from standard data sources for 26 OECD countries (see Annex A). The data show historical trends from 1960 and projected trends to 2030.

- Figure A5 is based on results of population projections made by the Secretariat for a synthetic country whose demographic characteristics are also based on averages across 26 OECD countries (see below).

Second, Figures A2, A3, A4 and A6 use projected population data from the medium variant projections made by the United Nations (1996 Revision). Of particular relevance for ageing issues is that the increases in life-expectancy of around 1 year per decade assumed for developed countries in these projections may be considered somewhat conservative by some demographers. Some researchers are suggesting, for example, that 2 or even 3 years per decade are not implausible future trends for developed countries. Consequently, the trends resulting from increased ageing in populations shown in these Figures may be somewhat understated. Conversely, the relatively low levels of net migration assumed in UN projections for most countries could be viewed as resulting in bias in the opposite direction, given that immigrants tend to be relatively young and therefore provide some counter to ageing populations. Finally, due to the time-span of the projection results used in these Figures (1995 to 2030), issues relating to future fertility trends are of relatively little significance. Annex B contains a more detailed discussion of these issues.

Third, the calculations underlying Figures A2, A3, A4, and A6 also use projections of participation rates. These are based on linear extrapolation of age-specific participation trends with a restriction that women's participation does not exceed 90 per cent of male participation in the same age-group. This results in declining total participation for the average OECD country from around 2005 onwards, when increasing female participation rates approach those of males and then follow downward trends.[2] The point of this approach is to provide a scenario indicating the implications of a continuation of current trends and to highlight the importance of policy reforms relating to labour force participation, such as reductions in the use of early retirement schemes.

Fourth, the range of projection scenarios used to generate Figure A5 was subject to certain constraints. In particular, for technical reasons, the "High Life Expectancy" scenario could, at most, assume an increase of about 1.3 years per decade in life-expectancy compared

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2.   The Secretariat made similar calculations which assumed age-specific participation rates to remain constant at 1995 levels. These also generated decline in the total participation rate (albeit much less), indicating that for the typical OECD country both the age-composition of the working-age population as well as age-specific participation rates contribute to decline in overall labour force participation.

with 1 year per decade in the baseline scenario. Therefore the figure does not demonstrate the effect of the rather more rapid increases in life-expectancy of 2 or 3 years per decade that some suggest possible. However, other evidence would seem to suggest that assumption of a more rapid increase in life-expectancy would not lead to a radically different conclusion compared with that drawn from Figure A5.[3] A second constraint, of rather less importance, was that the immigrant population was assumed to have the same demographic characteristics as the non-immigrant population. Projections which focus on the demographic effects of migration commonly assume that fertility rates and life expectancies are, at least on initial arrival in the country, different for the immigrant population compared to the non-immigrant population (see, for example, OECD, 1991).

Finally, one of the general points emphasised in Chapter 1 of *Maintaining Prosperity in an Ageing Society* is essentially that labour supply growth could act as a constraint on growth in living standards. Figure A3 in particular illustrates this point showing that *if* current trends in participation continue, historically upward trends in the share of the population in employment are likely to be reversed within the next 10 to 15 years. This suggests that unless future long-term productivity growth can be assumed to exceed historical norms, lower growth in aggregate output per head is likely for the future. There are, inevitably, a number of caveats to this argument. In particular, this reasoning omits speculation about what may happen to trends in average hours of work. On the one hand, if further reductions in average hours of work are considered likely, the prospect of reduced growth in living standards is increased. On the other hand, there are signs that trends have slowed considerably in recent years for many OECD countries (OECD*b*, 1998), suggesting that reductions in average working hours may no longer have significant impact on labour supply growth. A second caveat worth stressing is that the degree and timing with which supply constraints may act on employment growth depends also on the amount of spare capacity in the labour force in the form of unemployment. Where there are high levels of structural unemployment and given appropriate economic conditions, employment growth could remain relatively buoyant for some time despite contrary trends in population and labour force participation. Note that Figure A3 effectively assumes employment growth is sufficient to bring unemployment down to full-employment levels by 2005, after which time changes in the share of employment in total population are solely determined by demographic factors and trends in labour force participation. If the unemployment rate had been held constant

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3. For example Lutz et al (1996) publish projection results for major world regions which assume increases in life-expectancy of up to 3 years per decade. In their results for Western Europe, an increase of 1 year per decade implies a share of those aged 60+ in the total population of between 23 and 26 per cent by 2020, depending on fertility and migration assumptions. In the equivalent scenarios with life expectancy rising at 3 years per decade the share of those aged 60+ in the total population by 2020 ranges between 24 and 28 per cent. These results would suggest that within the time-frame of projections considered here, the difference in outcome generated by alternative views on trends in life expectancy is limited. A number of factors probably account for this: *i)* in OECD countries, those who reach 60 years of age currently expect to live for as many as 15 to 20 additional years, diluting the relative impact of additional years of life-expectancy on the size of the elderly population; *ii)* it takes time for the full impact of reduced mortality rates to work through the population, *e.g.* a reduction in the mortality rate of those aged 65 to 70 years will only affect the population of those aged 80 to 85 years after a period of 15 years; and *iii)* for many OECD countries, much of the growth in elderly populations in the next two to three decades is attributable to powerful cohort effects, in particular "baby-boom" generations reaching retirement age, which tend to overshadow the effects of increased longevity.

at 1995 levels Figure A3 would show a roughly constant employment to population ratio to 2005.

The following sections describe the sources and methods underlying each of the Figures in more detail.

II. Figure A1. Decomposition of men's (and women's) life course for an average country

Decomposition of men's life course for an average* country

Decomposition of women's life course for an average* country

* Average made over 15 countries : Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, New Zealand,Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States
Source : OECD Labour Force Statiistics, Part II; Eco Santé, ILO

* Average made over 15 countries : Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, New Zealand,Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics, Part II; Eco Santé, ILO

The data shown in the figure are the averages of individual calculations for 15 OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States).

Note that the calculation method computes the expected decomposition of life course on the basis of data for a single year. In this sense the results can be interpreted as a calculation of the expected decomposition of life course for someone born in that year based on the available information for that year. The estimates therefore do not reflect the *ex post* decomposition of life course which would be affected by changes in age of entry into the labour force, participation rates and so on over individuals' lifetimes. In addition, such calculations do not show the discontinuous nature of working histories; an important aspect of lifecycle activity, especially for women (the same applies comment applies to Figure A2).

The specific calculation method for each country is as follows:

- *Age of entry into the labour market*: Source*: Labour Force Statistics (Part II), OECD.*
  Based on an assumed minimum age of entry at 15 years and a calculation of the

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expected number of years spent outside the labour force by 15 to 24 year-olds using data on activity rates.

- *Years in employment*: Source, *Labour Force Statistics (Part II), OECD.* Calculation based on the total participation and unemployment rate of those aged 15-64.

- *Years in retirement*: Source: *Economically Active Population 1950-2010,* ILO. The ILO estimates are based on a model which uses declines in participation between successive age groups as the basis for estimating retirement age.

- *Life Expectancy at Birth*: Source, *Eco Santé*.

- *Years not in work*: calculated as a residual.

Data for "Decomposition of of Life Course for an average country"

Women
Average country based on unweighted average of 15 countries

	1960	1970	1980	1990	1995
Age of entry	19.7	19.7	19.5	19.5	19.5
Inactivity+Unemployment	24.4	21.4	16.5	12.7	12.4
Years in employment	20.7	22.2	25.4	28.1	27.7
Life expectancy-retirement age	8.6	12.3	16.5	19.9	21.4

Men
Average country based on unweighted average of 15 countries

	1960	1970	1980	1990	1995
Age of entry	17.3	17.9	18.4	18.9	19.0
Inactivity+Unemployment	3.3	3.7	4.3	4.8	6.3
Years in employment	45.8	43.8	41.1	39.0	36.9
Life expectancy-retirement age	1.3	3.4	7.0	10.2	11.5

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III. Figure A2. Expected number of years in and out of employment

Expected number of years in and out of employment for *males*.

Expected number of years in and out of employment for *females*.

**Expected number of years in employment for males and females.**

The data are based upon averaged data for 26 OECD countries (see Annex A). The calculation method is as follows:

- *Expected number of years in work:* the sum of expected number of years in employment across age-groups. The expected number of years in employment in a given age group is based on age-specific participation rates and an aggregate unemployment rate. The unemployment rate from 2000 onwards is assumed to equal that in 1995.

- *Expected number of years not in employment* is the difference between life-expectancies at birth and the expected number of years in employment.

IV. Figure A3 (also Figure 1.1 in main text). Shares of the labour force and employment in total population

Shares of the labour force and employment in total population.

The data are based upon averaged data for 26 OECD countries (see Annex A). The calculation method is as follows:

- *Share of total population in the labour force* is the sum-product of average population shares and average labour force participation rates across 5-year age-sex groups.

- *Share of total population in employment* is generated by applying average total unemployment rates to the total labour force to population ratios. The average unemployment rate in 1995 (a little under 9 per cent) is linearly extrapolated such that unemployment is 5 per cent in 2005 and remains at that level until the end of the projection period.

V. Figure A4 (also Figure 1.2 in main text). Ratios of persons aged 65 and over to the working age population and number in employment

Ratios of persons aged over 65 to the working age population and number in employment.

The data are based upon averaged data for 26 OECD countries (see Annex A). The calculation method is as follows:

- *Ratio of population aged over 65 to the population aged 15 to 64* calculated from the age-sex distribution of the representative population.

- *Ratio of population aged over 65 to total employment* is equal to the ratio of the share of those aged 65 and over in the total population to the ratio of employment to total population.

VI. Figure A5. Share of the adult population as a percentage of total population for various demographic scenarios

Share of adult population aged 15 to 64 as a percentage of total population in 2030, for various demographic scenarios

|	Baseline	High life expectancy	Low (Fertility)	High (Fertility)	Low (Migration)	High (Migration)
Fertility	1.6	1.6	1.4	2.3	1.6	1.6
Life expectancy - men	77.7	79.0	77.7	77.7	77.7	77.7
Life expectancy - women	83.5	85.0	83.5	83.5	83.5	83.5
Migration of 1995 population per year	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.125	0.5

These population projections were made in order to illustrate the likely range of demographic outcomes given uncertainties about future trends in fertility, mortality and migration. As discussed in Annex B the UN variants for the main part only illustrate the implications of different trends in fertility. In order to show the potential impact of alternative assumptions about mortality and migration as well as fertility, the Secretariat calculated projections based on a hypothetical country, the characteristics of which are based on averages across the same 26 OECD countries used as a basis for Figures A2, A3, A4 and A6. The approaches taken to calculation of the base population and future trends in fertility, mortality and migration are as follows (figures are shown in Annex C).

- *Base population.* Based from United Nations estimates for 1995. The population in each age-sex group is the product of the total population (arbitrarily set to equal 100) and calculations of the average share of that age-sex group in total population from the United Nations data across the 26 countries.

- *Fertility.* Baseline fertility (*i.e.* fertility in 1995) is equal to an average of annual fertility across OECD countries (about 1.6 children). The "low" and "high" variants are based on taking averages of fertility rates used in the equivalent United Nations projections, 2000 to 2030. In this dimension, the Secretariat's projections replicate the UN variants with fertilty in the low variant and high variants reaching 1.4 and 2.3 children by 2030.

- *Mortality*. Mortality is based on application of life expectancy at birth to Coale and Demeny life tables (the "North" variant). In the baseline scenario mortality is based on averages of life expectancy at birth assumed in UN projections. The resulting trends suggest increases in life expectancy of about 1 year per decade to 2030. The "high" variant is generated by increasing increments in life expectancy in the baseline projection by 30 per cent, thus implying an increase in life-expectancy of about 1.3 years per decade. More rapid increase in life-expectancy could not be modelled due to technical constraints in the projection software.[4]

- *Migration*. Annual net migration is constant throughout the projection period and the age-sex distribution is based on assessment of typical distributions of net migration. The immigrant population is assumed to have the same fertility and life expectancy characteristics as the total population.

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4.   The projection software allowed a maximum life-expectancy at birth of 79 years for men and 84 years for women. In some respects this limitation reflects the fact that until recently the received wisdom about life-expectancy was that medical science could probably do little to extend the average life-span of those aged 80+ without making major advances in reducing intrinsic biological ageing processes (see Annex B).

VII. Figure A6. Labour force participation of those aged 55 and over

Labour force participation of people aged 55+ (%).

The data are based upon averaged data for 26 OECD countries (see Annex A). The calculation method is as follows:

- *Estimates and projections based on current trends.* Based on an average of participation rates of cohorts aged 55 and over weighted by shares in the population aged 55 and over (see Annex A).

- *Participation required to maintain a constant employment to population ratio from 2005 onwards.* Calculated as the participation rate of those aged 55 and over required to maintain the share of employment in total population equal to about 47 per cent (*i.e.* that achieved in 2005 if trends in participation continue and unemployment reaches 5 per cent), assuming that participation in other age-groups follow current trends and that unemployment remains at 5 per cent.

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Annex A. Further details on the sources and methods used for Figures A2, A3, A4 and A6.

These Figures use a common set of average population shares, labour force participation rates and unemployment rates derived from data for across 26 OECD countries.[5] Of the current OECD member countries Korea, Mexico and Turkey are excluded from the calculations as they possess markedly different demographic characteristics compared to other OECD countries.

- *Population shares:* Data are taken from the United Nations estimates and medium variant projections (1996 Revision) (see Annex B). The population share of each age-sex group (*e.g.* the proportion of females aged 20 to 24 years in the total population) is calculated as the average of the corresponding shares for each of the 26 countries.

- *Labour force participation rates:* Data are taken from the 4th Edition of Estimates and Projections of the Economically Active Population, ILO. Historical estimates of participation rates for each age-sex group are based on averages of participation rates for each age-sex group based on the ILO data for 1960, 1970, 1980,1990 and 1995 (data points for 1965, 1975 and 1985 are linearly interpolated). Participation rates for those aged 65-69, 70-74, 75-79 and 80+ years are estimates based on participation rates for all those aged over 65 from the ILO data combined with assumptions about the distribution of participation in these older cohorts. Specifically, it is assumed that 65 per cent of the labour force aged over 65 are aged 65-69, 30 per cent are aged 70 to 74, 5 per cent are aged 75 to 79 and that those aged 80+ do not participate in the labour force. Projections of participation rates are based on linear extrapolation of the trend implied by the 1985 and 1995 data, with a constraint for female age groups that participation cannot exceed 90 per cent of male participation in the equivalent age group.

- *Life Expectancy at birth:* Data are averages across of historical estimates and medium variant projections across OECD countries from United Nations demographic data (1996 Revision).

- *Unemployment rates:* The data are averages of OECD annual unemployment rates across 23 of the 26 countries used in other calculations (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland are excluded).

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5.   Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Data for Figures

	1960	*1965*	*1970*	*1975*	*1980*	*1985*	*1990*	*1995*	*2000*	*2005*	*2010*	*2015*	*2020*	*2025*	*2030*
Expected number of years in employment (unemployment at 1995 level from 2000 onwards)															
Males	49.6	48.5	47.0	44.8	42.6	40.2	39.5	37.9	37.0	36.1	35.3	34.4	33.6	32.9	32.2
Females	20.2	21.6	22.7	24.3	25.8	26.4	28.1	27.9	28.8	29.6	30.1	29.9	29.7	29.3	28.8
Expected number of years not in employment															
Males	17.7	19.5	21.6	24.6	27.8	31.2	32.9	35.5	37.1	38.6	40.1	41.5	42.9	44.1	45.3
Females	52.3	52.1	51.9	51.6	51.3	51.7	50.9	51.8	51.5	51.3	51.4	52.0	52.8	53.6	54.5
Share of total population in the labour force															
Share of to	42.8	43.1	43.6	44.6	45.9	47.3	48.3	49.0	49.2	49.3	48.7	47.1	45.2	43.3	41.3
Share of total population in employment															
Share of to	41.9	42.4	42.7	43.0	43.8	43.7	45.2	44.6	45.8	46.8	46.2	44.8	43.0	41.1	39.2
Ratio of persons aged over 65 to population aged 15 to 64 (x100)															
Ratio of p	14.9	15.8	17.2	18.4	19.3	19.1	20.1	21.0	20.8	21.4	22.5	25.3	28.3	31.4	34.7
Ratio of persons aged over 65 to total employment (x100)															
Ratio of p	22.6	23.6	25.5	27.2	28.5	28.9	29.7	31.4	30.4	30.6	32.7	37.2	42.5	48.3	54.6
Labour force participation of those aged 55 to 79															
Estimates	41.0	39.3	37.0	32.5	30.2	29.3	27.2	26.3	25.1	25.3	24.0	21.9	19.8	18.1	16.5
Labour force participation required to maintain a constant total employment to population ratio from 2005 onwards															
Participation required to maintain a constant total employment to populati										25.3	26.8	30.4	34.8	39.2	43.7

Annex B. The United Nations, 1996 Revision, population projections

Figures A2, A3, A4 and A6 use the United Nations, 1996 Revision, population estimates and medium variant projections. The United Nations conducts a revision of its demographic estimates and projections every two years, the 1996 Revision published projections to 2050 with 1995 as the base-year. The UNs' method is to make projections for individual countries on a world-wide basis, these results being aggregated to produce global and regional projections. As well as medium projections, the published results include two other variants, "low" and "high", generated largely through using different assumptions about future fertility trends. Migration assumptions are altered for some countries and mortality assumptions remain the same across all three variants.

In the medium variant projections, fertility is assumed to trend towards replacement levels. In the case of most OECD countries this implies increased fertility in coming decades. Although this is not an implausible assumption, there is a good deal of debate as to possibility of increased fertility in developed countries with the result that some researchers think that a more reasonable central projection is one which assumes continuation of below-replacement fertility as the most likely outcome. However, Figures A2, A3, A4 and A6 are probably relatively insensitive to alternative fertility assumptions due to the focus on developments only up to the year 2030, a period in which even the broadest plausible range of fertility outcomes generates little variation in growth in the working-age population and no variation in growth in the elderly population. The reason for this is that future fertility trends assumed in projections trends are progressive in their impact. For example, given a base-year of 1995, the population of those aged over 15 is only affected by fertility assumptions after 2010 and then only marginally. By 2030 only the population aged under 35 years will have been generated by whatever is assumed about fertility from 1995 onwards.

Low levels of infant mortality in most OECD countries now imply that increased years of life-expectancy at birth are, almost exclusively, manifestations of reductions in mortality rates amongst the elderly. Forecasts for the future therefore rely very much on assessment of the health and longevity of older people. The United Nations 1996 Revision projections for most OECD countries assume growth in life-expectancy of approximately 1 year per decade (or less) with the result that life-expectancies are never assumed to rise above approximately 85 years in coming decades. This approach is probably based on a widely received wisdom that most deaths at advanced ages are due to intrinsic and intractable ageing processes which would require fundamental and unforeseeable breakthroughs in medical knowledge and care. However, a reasonably large literature has more recently emerged which argues that significant increases in life expectancy for those aged over 80 are indeed possible and that increases of 2 or even 3 years per decade are possible for the future (see, for example, Vaupel and Lunstrom, 1996). This would suggest that, at least in the eyes of some researchers, the concerns about high growth rates in older age cohorts illustrated in the Figures may be somewhat understated.

The United Nations projections assume zero net migration for most OECD countries from early on in the projection. As a result, the data for the "typical" OECD country represent a demographic outcome where there are very low levels of net migration and in this sense some of the effects of ageing shown in Figures A2, A3, A4 and A6 may be over-stated if it is thought that net migration may be more significant and that it comprises net inflows of relatively young immigrants. It should be noted that it is not uncommon for projections to make fairly conservative assumptions about the volume of net migration. One reason for this is that where projections are made for a large number of countries, maintenance of a complex migration structure is difficult since it involves continual balancing of outflows against inflows. In addition, estimation of future trends in migration is extremely difficult. Existing data on migration are not always accurate and even when the data are considered reasonable, they often reveal a highly variable

pattern over time. Many of the more significant waves of migration are the result of political unrest and crisis which largely defy prediction (Zlotnik (1996)).

As a final note, the results of the UNs' 1998 Revision (not published in detail at the time of writing) are reported to have assumed lower levels of fertility for developed countries and to have included the possibility of more rapid increase in life-expectancy compared with the 1996 Revision. This suggests that the latest projections have accommodated some of the criticism levelled at assumptions of rising fertility and conservative assessment of future increases in life expectancy.

Annex C

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PROJECTIONS FOR A REPRESENTATIVE OECD

	Population in base-year (1995)*			Age-sex distribution of net migration (%)	
	Males	Females		Males	Females
0-4	3.2	3.1	0-4	4.1	2.8
5-9	3.2	3.1	5-9	4.2	2.7
10-14	3.3	3.2	10-14	3.2	2.2
15-19	3.5	3.3	15-19	7.6	5.0
20-24	3.7	3.6	20-24	11.3	7.6
25-29	3.9	3.7	25-29	6.2	4.0
30-34	3.9	3.8	30-34	4.8	2.7
35-39	3.8	3.7	35-39	3.7	2.0
40-44	3.6	3.6	40-44	3.0	1.8
45-49	3.5	3.5	45-49	2.6	1.6
50-54	2.9	2.9	50-54	2.1	1.4
55-59	2.5	2.6	55-59	1.8	1.3
60-64	2.3	2.5	60-64	1.6	1.2
65-69	2.1	2.4	65-69	1.4	1.1
70-74	1.6	2.2	70-74	1.1	1.0
75-79	1.0	1.5	75-79	0.6	0.7
80+	1.0	2.1	80+	0.7	0.9
	49.2	50.8		60.0	40.0

Total Fertility Rates**

	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025	2025-2030
Low	1.70	1.55	1.49	1.46	1.44	1.43	1.43	1.42
High	1.70	1.72	1.82	1.92	2.01	2.11	2.20	2.28

Life Expectancy at birth (years)**

Males	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025	2025-2030
Baseline	73.7	74.4	75.1	75.7	76.2	76.7	77.2
High	73.7	74.7	75.5	76.3	77.0	77.6	78.3

Females							
Baseline	80.0	80.6	81.2	81.7	82.2	82.6	83.1
High	80.0	80.8	81.5	82.2	82.9	83.4	84.1

Source, OECD secretariat
*Note that population units are arbitary, total population in 1995 equals 100.
** Data are annual averages over the 5-year periods shown, note Fig. 5 shows estimates for single years (1995 and 2030).

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